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SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE
CROSS-LISTING PREMIUM
Kate Litvak*
This article tests whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX") affected the
premium that investors are willing to pay for shares of foreign companies
cross-listed in the United States. Ifind that from year-end 2001 (pre-SOX) to
year-end 2002 (after SOX adoption), the Tobin's q and market/book ratios of
foreign companies subject to SOX (cross-listed on levels 2 or 3) declined sig-
nificantly, relative to Tobin's q and market/book ratios of both (i) matching
non-cross-listed foreign companies from the same country, the same industry,
and of similar size, and (ii) cross-listed companies from the same country that
are not subject to SOX (listed on levels 1 or 4), whose Tobin's q and mar-
ket/book ratios declined only slightly and increased in some specifications,
compared to matching non-cross-listed companies. Thus, the premium associ-
ated with trading in the United States was roughly constant, while the
premium associated with being subject to U.S. regulation declined. The big-
gest losers were companies that were more profitable, riskier, and smaller,
companies with a higher level of pre-SOX disclosure, and companies from
well-governed countries. These results are consistent with the view that inves-
tors expected SOX to have greater costs than benefits for cross-listed firms on
average, especially for smaller firms and already well-governed firms.
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INTRODUCTION
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX")' was adopted in haste, leaving
businessmen, academics, and legislators to repent at leisure.2 In the name of
investor confidence, SOX regulates lawyers, accountants, auditors, invest-
ment bankers, securities analysts, corporate directors and officers, stock
exchanges, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board, and a variety of other governmental
and non-governmental bodies, organizations, and professions. It applies to
all U.S. public companies and to foreign companies cross-listed in the
United States on levels 2 and 3 ("level-23 companies").3 It does not apply to
foreign companies that are traded in the United States on cross-listing levels
1 and 4 ("level-14 companies").4
It is hard to assess whether investors believed SOX was good or bad on
average for U.S. firms. Events surrounding the adoption of SOX often corre-
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 15, 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
2. For academic repentance, see, for example, Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbox: The Road to Nir-
vana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279; Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-
Oxley: Legislating in Haste, Repenting in Leisure 7-10 (UCLA Law & Econ. Research, Paper No.
06-14, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=899593; Larry Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley after
Three Years (Illinois Law & Econ., Working Paper No. LE05-016, 2005), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=746884 [hereinafter Ribstein, SOX after Three Years]. Other academics
have argued that the importance of SOX is overstated. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV.
915 (2003). A few have defended it. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Reinvention of Corporate Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189 (2003); Robert A. Prentice & David
B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise is the Received Wisdom?,
95 GEo. L.J. (forthcoming 2007).
3. A level-2 company has shares listed and traded on the New York Stock Exchange or the
NASDAQ national market system. A level-3 company has made a public offering in the United
States. Sarbanes Oxley Act § 2(a)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 7201(a(7), defines "issuer" to include any com-
pany with securities registered under Securities Exchange Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781, which level 2
and level 3 companies are required to do. The principal substantive provisions of SOX apply to all
"issuers" or sometimes to companies which file periodic reports under Securities Exchange Act §
13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m, which all companies with registered securities must do. See Cleary, Gottlieb,
Steen & Hamilton, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Ushers in Sweeping Changes for Public Companies
in the United States (Aug. 5, 2002) (on file with author) ("With a few exceptions, the Act applies to
all 'issuers' .... [T]his includes all SEC-reporting companies, domestic or foreign."). The SEC
retains exemptive authority, but in general has not used this authority to exempt foreign issuers from
the principal provisions of SOX.
4. A company with a level-1 listing has shares traded on NASDAQ but not through the
NASDAQ national market system. A level-4 company has shares traded in the institutions-only
"Rule 144A" market.
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sponded to price changes in U.S. markets, but one cannot rule out other
causes.5 Likewise, while the aftermath of SOX was marked by an increasing
number of U.S. public companies going private6 or going "dark,"' contem-
poraneous events might have been partly responsible for these trends.
The effect of SOX on cross-listed firms is easier to assess. First, cross-
country data make it easier to rule out competing explanations in studies of
delistings and reduced cross-listing rates.8 Second, statistics about the trends
in cross-listing on other countries' exchanges (especially London, the new
cross-listing destination of choice) inform our judgment on whether the
flight from U.S. exchanges was connected to SOX.9
Third, for cross-listed firms we have a more reliable way of controlling
for contemporaneous events through the use of difference-in-differences
methodology, following a method I developed in a prior paper.'0 My differ-
ence-in-differences solution is based on the differential application of SOX
to otherwise similar foreign public companies. Because SOX applies to
level-23 foreign companies ("treatment" group), but not to level-14 or
unlisted foreign companies (two "control" groups), we have a natural ex-
periment unavailable for U.S. firms.
In a prior paper, I compare a "treatment" set of level-23 companies from
thirty-six countries to a "control" set of similar non-cross-listed companies
(same country, same industry, similar in size) and to a second "control" set
of level-14 companies from the same country. I find that stock prices of
level-23 companies declined (increased) significantly, compared to both
control groups, during key announcements indicating that SOX would
(would not) fully apply to level-23 companies. I also find variation in the
5. For examples of prior event studies, see Pankaj K. Jain & Zabihollah Rezaee, The Sar-
banes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Accounting Conservatism (June 2004), http://ssm.com/abstract=
554643; Pankaj K. Jain, Jang-Chul Kim, & Zabihollah Rezaee, Trends and Determinants of Market
Liquidity in the Pre- and Post- Sarbanes-Oxley Act Periods (Sept. 2006), http://ssm.com/abstract=
488142; Haidan Li, Morton Picus, & Sonja Olhoft Rego, Market Reaction to Events Surrounding
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Earnings Management (Sept. 24, 2006), http://ssm.com/
abstract=475163; Ivy Xiying Zhang, Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(June 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
6. See Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic & Eric Talley, Going-Private Decisions and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis (USC CLEO Research, Paper No. C06-5,
2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=901769; Ellen Engel, Rachel M. Hayes, & Xue Wang,
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms' Going-Private Decisions (May 6, 2004), http://ssm.com/
abstract=546626.
7. See Christian Leuz, Alexander J. Triantis, & Tracy Yue Wang, Why Do Firms go Dark?
Causes and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations (Robert H. Smith Research,
Paper No. RHS 06-045, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=592421. Firms "go dark" when
they stop filing with the SEC, but continue to sell over-the-counter.
8. See Peter Hostak, Emre Karaoglu, Thomas Lys, & Yong George Yang, An Examination
of the Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Attractiveness of U.S. Capital Markets to Foreign
Firms (Jan. 8, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=956020.
9. See Luigi Zingales, Is the U.S. Capital Market Losing Its Competitive Edge? J. ECON.
PERSP. (forthcoming 2007); Joseph D. Piotroski & Suraj Srinivasan, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
the Flow of International Listings (Jan. 2007), http://ssrn.con/abstract=956987.
10. See Kate Litvak, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Foreign Companies Cross-
Listed in the U.S., J. CORP. FIN. (forthcoming 2007).
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reactions of level-23 firms. The negative reaction to SOX is strong for com-
panies with high scores on a disclosure index produced contemporaneously
by Standard & Poor's ("S&P") and for firms located in well-governed coun-
tries (using as proxies Europe, the median S&P disclosure score for all firms
from each country, and each country's GDP per capita). The negative reac-
tion is weaker for faster-growing firms. That is, for high-disclosing
companies from well-governed countries, investors expected SOX to be par-
ticularly bad. For fast-growing, low-disclosing firms, SOX may have been
neutral or even positive, on average, especially if those firms are located in
poorly governed countries."
In this paper, I extend my prior research to the question of cross-listing
premia. Historically, cross-listed companies traded at a premium to similar
non-cross-listed companies." Traditional explanations-that cross-listing
minimized costs created by market segmentation-have been undermined
by the decline in segmentation brought by improvements in communications
technologies. More recent research explains the cross-listing premium as
due to legal bonding, where a high-quality company from a country with
poor corporate governance credibly signals its quality and commits to good
behavior by subjecting itself to the stricter laws, regulations, accounting
rules, and listing standards of another country. 3 Such a commitment to high-
quality governance may be valuable to firms' controlling investors, who, in
exchange for giving up secrecy and opportunities for self-dealing, reduce a
firm's costs of capital. The bonding theory predicts, and researchers find,
higher cross-listing premia for level-23 companies than for less-regulated
level- 14 companies. 
4
If part of a level-23 firm's premium is determined by the quality of the
U.S. governance regime, then, we can infer investors' reactions to SOX by
comparing before- and after-SOX premia. Similar to Doidge and his co-
authors, ' I measure the cross-listing premium as the difference between the
Tobin's q of firms subject to SOX (cross-listed on levels 2 or 3) and the
Tobin's q of the two control groups of firms not subject to SOX (non-cross-
listed or cross-listed on levels 1 or 4). As a robustness check, I also compare
market-to-book ratios of firms subject to SOX and firms not subject to SOX.
I find that both Tobin's q and market-to-book ratios of level-23 compa-
nies declined significantly during 2002 relative to level-14 companies and
11. Id.
12. G. Andrew Karolyi, Why Do Companies List Shares Abroad? A Survey of the Evidence
and its Managerial Implications, 7 FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS 1 (1998).
13. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in
Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 641 (1999); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on Interna-
tional Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (2002).
14. See Craig Doidge, US. Cross-Listings and the Private Benefits of Control: Evidence
from Dual Class Firms, 72 J. FIN. ECON. 519 (2004) [hereinafter Dual Class]; Craig Doidge, G.
Andrew Karolyi, & Rene M. Stulz, Why are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?, 71 J.
FIN. EON. 205 (2004).
15. Doidge et al., supra note 14.
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relative to non cross-listed companies. The Tobin's q and market-to-book
ratios of level-14 companies declined slightly (generally insignificantly)
relative to non-cross-listed companies, and increased in some specifications.
These results are robust across a variety of empirical specifications. Thus,
the premium associated with trading in the United States was roughly con-
stant, while the premium associated with being subject to U.S. regulation
declined.
The declines in Tobin's q vary based on company and country charac-
teristics. This variation is generally consistent with the hypothesis that
well-governed firms suffered larger losses. The declines are larger for
more profitable firms, for firms with a higher level of pre-SOX disclosure,
for firms located in countries with higher levels of overall disclosure and
higher GDPs per capita, and for firms in European countries. Smaller
companies suffered larger declines, consistent with prior theoretical and
empirical work reporting a size-based impact of SOX. '6 Riskier firms suf-
fered larger declines as well, consistent with the view that SOX induces
firms to reduce risk, possibly below optimal levels. The results for market-
to-book ratios are consistent with the Tobin's q results, but they are less
often statistically significant.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Part I summarizes the
existing literature on cross-listing premia and develops testable hypotheses
linking cross-listing premia to investors' reaction to SOX. Parts II and III
discuss my sample and methodology. Part IV presents results. Part V pro-
poses a "comply or explain" policy for level-23 firms that could help
evaluate which provisions of SOX are thought by investors to be beneficial
and which are thought to be detrimental.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOX AND THE CROSS-LISTING PREMIUM
A. Implications of the Cross-Listing Premium for Regulatory Quality
The cross-listing literature suggests there are two principal reasons why
firms might decide to list on a foreign stock exchange: (i) to obtain greater
liquidity for their shares and greater access to investor capital; and (ii) to
bond the company to a better overall corporate governance regime (a com-
bination of legal rules, securities regulations, accounting rules, listing
standards, and analyst coverage). Recent research emphasizes the impor-
tance of the second, bonding explanation. 
7
16. 'See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance:
What's Right and What's Wrong?, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8 (2003); Vidhi Chhaochharia & Yaniv
Grinstein, Corporate Governance and Firm Value-The Impact of the 2002 Governance Rules, J.
FIN. (forthcoming 2007); Kamar et al., supra note 6; Modupe 'Jide' Wintoki, Corporate Boards,
Regulation and Firm Value: The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Exchange Listing Re-
quirements, J. CORP. FIN. (forthcoming 2007).
17. For a comprehensive literature review, see G. Andrew Karolyi, The World of Cross-Listings
and Cross-Listings of the World: Challenging Conventional Wisdom (Dice Center, Working Paper No.
2004-14, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=577021. For evidence that cross-listing protects
minority shareholders and reduces controllers' opportunism, see Dual Class; Alexander Dyck & Luigi
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The payoff to companies for cross-listing may come partly through in-
creased ability to issue new shares or to conduct share-financed acquisitions,
even without an increase in equilibrium share price. But an important part of
the payoff is a higher share price. Prior research finds that both level-23
companies and level-14 companies trade at a premium to apparently similar
non-cross-listed companies, with level-23 companies enjoying a higher
premium than level-14 companies. Tobin's q is a common way to measure
this premium' 9 and is the principal measure I rely on in this paper. As a ro-
bustness check, I also use the market-to-book ratio.
The cross-listing premium varies over time, so it clearly depends on
more than just the quality of the listing country's governance regime. More-
over, the premium is partly endogenous-firms that would in any case merit
a higher premium are more likely to cross-list. Still, prior research suggests
a remaining, plausibly causal effect, in which cross-listed firms trade at
higher prices because there are net benefits to cross-listing.
The cross-listing premium is important to study for two largely distinct
reasons. First, cross-listing has important costs (compliance with stricter
governance and accounting rules; exposure to the threat of shareholder liti-
gation, which is common in the United States and rare elsewhere, and so
on). The premium is one of the principal benefits to foreign firms consider-
ing cross-listing, and might offset the incremental costs. If the premium
declines, the competitiveness of U.S. securities markets presumably declines
as well.
Second, if changes in the cross-listing premium can be tied to regulatory
changes, they provide a rare opportunity to assess the quality of the regula-
tory changes as perceived by investors. If SOX truly provided a boost to
investor confidence, the premia for level-23 companies should have risen
after its adoption, as compared to the premia for level-14 companies. If it
created greater regulatory cost than regulatory benefit, the level-23 premia
should have fallen, and the wisdom of the regulatory change should perhaps
be reconsidered.
My research design addresses only the apparent value of SOX for
cross-listed firms. I do not address the value of SOX for U.S. firms. I
study cross-listed firms in large part because the comparison of the treat-
ment group of level-23 companies to the control groups of level-14
companies and non-cross-listed companies provides a reasonably direct
measure of the impact of SOX that is not available for U.S. firms.
It is possible that SOX had net costs for cross-listed firms (at least those
from well-governed countries), but net benefits for U.S. firms. Still, if the
net cost of SOX for foreign firms from well-governed countries can be es-
Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537 (2004); and Tatiana
Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 325
(2003).
18. Doidge et al., supra note 14.
19. Id.
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tablished, this would support the possibility that the same conclusion may
hold for U.S. companies.
B. Competing Explanations for Change in the Cross-Listing Premium
Any effort to connect the adoption of SOX to a change in cross-listing
premia must address competing explanations. It is not enough to observe
that cross-listing premia declined in 2002, when SOX was adopted. Cross-
listing premia might have declined for other reasons. My solution is to com-
pare the premium for level-23 companies to the level-14 premium. This
comparison factors out events that affect the general attractiveness of expo-
sure to U.S. financial markets and provides a more focused look at the
attractiveness of the extra regulation to which level-23 firms are subject. A
central feature of my research design is that I study not only the cross-listing
premium, but the difference in premia between level-23 and level-14 com-
20panies.
A second possibility is that the decline in the level-23 versus level-14 pre-
mium is due not to adoption of SOX, but to the scandals that prompted SOX,
which led investors to believe that U.S. governance was not as good as it was
previously believed to be. This explanation would predict that the prices of
level-23 companies would decline during scandal events, but remain stable or
even increase around the time of news announcements related to SOX. My
prior research largely rules out this explanation. The prices of level-23 com-
panies declined significantly relative to their non-cross-listed matches during
SOX adoption events (and rose significantly during one event which indicated
regulatory flexibility). There was no significant price reaction to the mid-2002
announcement of the WorldCom scandal.2'
Finally, companies that chose to cross-list on levels 2 or 3 might be sys-
tematically different from their peers that chose to cross-list on levels 1 or 4,
or from those that chose not to cross-list at all. Although I control for a variety
of company-level characteristics (such as size, profitability, industry, sales
growth, pre-SOX level of unsystematic risk, leverage, the quality of disclo-
sure, and so forth), it is possible that there is an unobserved difference that
drives the result. It is possible, for example, that the same unobserved charac-
teristic that caused firms to cross-list on level 2 or 3 in the first place later
caused the decline in those firms' premia during the SOX year. This possibil-
ity cannot be entirely ruled out. Still, it seems unlikely, given the large number
of robustness checks that I perform, and given the complementary findings of
my event study paper.
20. Cf. Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Interim Report (Nov. 30, 2006),
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee Interim-ReportREV2.pdf (reporting, in a widely
publicized study with a distinguished group of academic and non-academic authors-including R.
Glenn Hubbard, Luigi Zingales, Reinier Kraakman, Allen Ferrell, Kenneth Scott, John Coffee, and
Peter Tufano-evidence that the premium to level-23 companies declined during 2002, but not
addressing whether this premium declined relative to the level-14 premium).
21. Litvak, supra note 10. My event study paper does not study other scandals, such as the
Enron bankruptcy.
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C. Hypothesis Development
A number of legal scholars have argued that the costs of SOX outweigh
the benefits. Some have suggested that this is also true for foreign cross-.21
listed companies. I test this prediction, which can be formalized as follows:
Main Hypothesis 1: Cross-listing premia for foreign companies subject
to SOX declined during the period of SOX adoption, relative to cross-listing
premia offoreign companies not subject to SOX.
In addition, if the Act's requirements both improve firm governance and
increase compliance costs, it is plausible that well-governed firms and firms
from countries with high-quality corporate governance and institutional en-
vironment will realize smaller benefits than costs, and thus will be hurt more
than poorly-governed firms and firms from countries with low-quality cor-
porate governance and institutional environment. I therefore test the
following sub-hypotheses:
Sub-Hypothesis 2a: Cross-listed companies that were well governed
prior to SOX adoption experienced larger declines in cross-listing premia
during the period of SOX adoption.
Sub-Hypothesis 2b: Cross-listed companies from countries with high-
quality corporate governance and institutional environment experienced
larger declines in cross-listing premia during the period of SOX adoption.
Because some Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costs are either fixed or in-
crease less than proportionately with firm size, while benefits seem more
likely to be proportional to firm size, small firms might be particularly dis-
advantaged by SOX. I therefore test the following sub-hypothesis:
Sub-Hypothesis 3: Larger cross-listed companies experienced smaller
declines in cross-listing premia during the period of SOX adoption than
smaller cross-listed companies.
Faster growing firms, with greater need to raise external capital, may
also benefit more (be harmed less) by SOX than slower growing firms. I
therefore test the following sub-hypothesis:
Sub-Hypothesis 4: Faster-growing cross-listed companies experienced
smaller declines in cross-listing premia during the period of SOX adoption
than slower-growing cross-listed companies.
Critics argued that SOX increases managerial risk-aversion by penaliz-
ing non-traditional business strategies. If firms adopt risk levels in response
to their unique needs, riskier firms may be hurt more by SOX because the
reduction in risk imposes larger costs on them.
Sub-Hypothesis 5: Riskier cross-listed companies subject to SOX ex-
perienced larger declines in cross-listing premia during the period of SOX
adoption than less risky companies.
22. Romano, supra note 2; SOX After Three Years.
23. Larry E. Ribstein, International Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley: Raising the Rent on
U.S. Law, 3 J. CoRp. L. STUD. 299 (2003).
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II. THE SAMPLE AND VARIABLES
A. Sample
Foreign securities can be listed in the United States on four different lev-
els: (1) Level 1 ADRs are sold over-the-counter ("OTC") and require minimal
SEC registration and no additional disclosure; (2) Level 2 ADRs are listed on
U.S. securities exchanges, principally the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") or traded on the NASDAQ national market system; they must
comply with the registration and reporting requirements of the Securities Ex-
change Act and related SEC rules; (3) Level 3 ADRs involve a public offering
of securities in the United States, typically followed by listing and trading on
a U.S. exchange or the NASDAQ national market system; they must comply
with the registration and reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange
Act and related SEC rules; (4) Level 4 ADRs are for securities with trading
limited to large institutional investors in the "PORTAL" market under SEC
Rule 144A; they are not subject to SEC regulation. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
applies to foreign companies cross-listed on levels 2 and 3.
To construct a sample of cross-listed companies, I begin with a list of all
foreign companies cross-listed in the United States on all levels of listing
(OTC, stock exchanges and NASDAQ, and PORTAL) between 2001 and
2005, obtained by combining the Citigroup Universal Issuance Guide with
the Citigroup Capital Raising database. Information on Canadian firms that
are traded on NYSE and NASDAQ is obtained from the exchanges' web-
sites .2 For all companies that had several listing types, I assign the most
regulated listing level. That is, if a company is traded on NYSE (level 2) and
OTC (level 1), I treat it as a level 2 company.
I match the cross-listed firms onto the Datastream database, which con-
tains share price and financial data. The result is a list of all 1204 foreign
companies cross-listed in the United States (on all listing levels) for which
trading data is available between January 2001 and May 2005. I then match
every cross-listed company to the non-cross-listed company in the same coun-
try and the same industry that is the closest in size as measured by market
capitalization as of July 2005, for which trading data are available for 2001-
2005 on Datastream. Matched companies are similar in governance character-
istics: the correlation in S&P disclosure scores between cross-listed
companies and their matches is 0.76. I exclude affiliates of foreign companies
and branches of the same company that are recognizable by name. The final
sample is 1016 cross-listed companies, of which 385 are level-23 and 631 are
level-14, plus their matched pairs. Table 1, Panel A provides summary statis-
tics on the countries that cross-listed firms come from.
24. Citigroup, http://wwss.citissb.com/adr/www/brokers/index.htm (last visited Feb. 6,
2007).
25. The shares of Canadian firms are traded directly on U.S. exchanges or on NASDAQ.
Shares of most other companies are first converted to ADRs; the ADRs are then traded. The Citi-
group databases provide a list of ADRs, but not Canadian shares.
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TABLE I
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
PANEL A: SUMMARY DATA ON MATCHED PAIRS
The second column indicates the number of cross-listed companies in each
country with trading data for 2001-2005 available on Datastream. Each cross-listed
company is matched with a non-cross-listed company from the same country and
industry, and closest available market capitalization as of July 2005. Difference in
market capitalization is not capped. The third column contains the number of cross-
listed companies with an available match. The fourth column contains the number of
level-23 matched pairs. The fifth column contains the median market capitalization
of cross-listed companies (all levels) and matched non-cross-listed companies.
1 2 3 4 5
Cross-Listed MMedian Market Cap
Companies, Matched Pairs Level-23 of Cross-Listed
All Levels All Levels Matched Pairs CompaniesCountry (Matches), $M
Argentina 18 13 10 435(223)
Australia 59 52 11 124(86)
Belgium 3 3 1 5647(2071)
Brazil 53 44 23 659 (388)
Canada 95 85 85 1185 (428)
Chile 14 13 11 1565(950)
Croatia 1 0 0
Czech Republic 1 0 0
China 24 20 6 324 (170)
Denmark 3 2 1 17,387 (15,906)
Ecuador 1 1 0
Egypt 8 6 0 671 (357)
Finland 9 7 4 2402 (398)
France 40 40 26 6260 (617)
Germany 39 36 19 7318(692)
Greece 8 6 2 4479(52)
Hong Kong 90 88 9 644(182)
Hungary 10 3 0 2560(131)
India 66 52 9 643 (278)
Indonesia 4 0 0
Ireland 12 6 2 887 (933)
Israel 14 10 7 303(116)
Italy 21 21 9 3394 (384)
Japan 125 113 20 4753 (2526)
Korea 29 25 5 4799 (621)
Luxembourg 2 2 1 1288 (122)
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1 2 3 4 5
Cross-Listed Median Market Cap
Companies, Matched Pairs, Level-23 of Cross-Listed
All Levels All Levels Matched Pairs CompaniesCountry (Matches), $M
Malaysia 12 12 0 214 (134)
Mexico 30 26 15 720 (281)
Morocco 1 1 0 1026(631)
Netherlands 32 11 6 1454(315)
New Zealand 6 4 2 1061 (1361)
Norway 15 12 4 1141 (617)
Pakistan 3 3 0 513(73)
Peru 5 4 2 558(322)
Philippines 14 12 1 460(52)
Poland 12 7 0 432(18)
Portugal 7 4 1 2514(447)
Romania 1 0 0
Russia 22 21 2 1128(265)
Singapore 20 19 2 1663 (674)
Slovakia 1 1 0 175(1501)
South Africa 35 30 7 805(157)
Spain 11 8 5 27,756 (2,830)
Sri Lanka 1 1 0 529(183)
Sweden 22 19 11 4589 (852)
Switzerland 18 15 10 17,381 (2,120)
Taiwan 39 36 4 1411 (816)
Thailand 11 10 0 524 (245)
Turkey 15 14 0 683(346)
United Kingdom 110 94 51 4912 (792)
Venezuela 11 4 1 57(16)
TOTAL 1203 1016 385 1792 (503)
B. Variables
To measure company-level governance, I use the measure of disclosure
developed by Standard and Poor's in 2001, the year before SOX was
26
adopted. The S&P ratings have been used in the literature before. The total
score is composed of three sub-scores-financial transparency and informa-
tion disclosure, board and management structure and process, and
26. See Doidge et al., supra note 14; Art Durnev & E. Han Kim, To Steal or Not to Steal:
Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation, 60 J. FIN. 1461 (2005).
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ownership structure and investor relations.27 I report the results for the cu-
mulative score; results for sub-scores are consistent (not reported). After
matching the S&P sample against my sample, I get 449 overlapping obser-
vations, including 155 level-23 companies. An alternative measure of
company-level governance, developed by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia
("CLSA"), produces only 47 level-23 overlaps with my dataset and is there-
fore not useful for this project.
As a measure of firm-level ownership concentration, I use NOSHEM, a
Datastream variable defined as the percentage of a company's shares held
by executives with significant voting power and by employees. I am able to
match 888 companies, 335 of them listed on levels 2 or 3. Alternative meas-
ures of ownership concentration, developed by Faccio and Lang,2s and by
29Claessens and others, produce a small number of overlaps with my dataset
and are not usable.
Firm-level data for company size, sales growth, leverage, industry, and
EBIT ("earnings before interest and taxes") are from the Datastream data-
base. I measure company size as assets at year-end of 2001, measured in
millions of U.S. dollars. Sales growth is the two-year geometric average of
annual growth in sales from 1999 to 2001. I use sales growth as a measure
of a firn's growth opportunities.0 After missing observations of sales
growth are eliminated, the number of SOX-affected matched pairs declines
from 385 to 299.
I compute leverage as the book value of debt divided by the value of
common equity; after missing observations are dropped, the set of SOX-
affected matched pairs shrinks from 385 to 322.
I compute Tobin's q as follows: For the numerator, I use the sum of book
value of preferred shares, market value of common shares, and book value
of debt. For the denominator, I ise book value of assets. After missing ob-
servations are eliminated, the set of level-23 pairs shrinks from 385 to 319.
As a measure of profitability, I use net income margin: the ratio of net
income before preferred dividends over total sales. After eliminating firms
with missing data, I reduce the size of the level-23 set from 385 to 304. I
measure unsystematic risk as the standard deviation of a firm's abnormal
returns during 2001, relative to a country-level market index.
27. For discussion of the S&P methodology, see Sandeep A. Patel & George S. Dallas,
Transparency and Disclosure: Overview of Methodology and Study Results-United States (October
16, 2002), http://ssrn.com/abstract=422800.
28. Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corpora-
tions, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365 (2002).
29. Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership and
Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81 (2000).
30. Sales growth is commonly used as a proxy for a firm's growth opportunities. See Rafael
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN.
1 (2006); Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, & Rene M. Stulz, Why Do Countries Matter so Much
for Corporate Governance? (ECGI, Working Paper No. 50/2004, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=580883.
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As country-level variables, I use several measures developed by La Porta
and his co-authors (antidirector rights, accounting rules), as well as an alter-
native measure of antidirector rights developed by Spamann.3 I also use
several measures of countries' political economies developed by Mark
Roe-budget of the financial regulator, government subsidies and transfers,
and labor regulation."
Gross Domestic Product per capita is from the World Bank's World De-
velopment Indicators database for 2001.
Table 1, Panel B contains univariate comparisons of independent vari-
ables.
31. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106
J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Holger Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta
et al. 's "Anti-Director Rights Index" under Consistent Coding (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr.
Discussion Paper No. 7, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=894301.
32. Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modem Stock Markets, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 460
(2006).
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III. METHODOLOGY
I measure cross-listing premia in two ways: on a pair level and on an in-
dividual company level. The methodology is the same with Tobin's q and
market-to-book as the dependent variable; the discussion below assumes the
dependent variable is Tobin's q.
A. After-Minus-Before Differences
I use year-end 2002 as the after-SOX measurement date and year-end
2001 as the before-SOX date. Regulatory events related to SOX and its appli-
cation to foreign companies begin in January 2002 and continue through
October 2002." 1 am interested in the after-minus-before change in Tobin's q.
For company-level results, I calculate ln(Tobin's q) at year-end 2001
("before") and year-end 2002 ("after") for each cross-listed company and
each non-cross-listed matching firm, winsorized at 1%/99%, and an after-
minus-before change in the winsorized values (6lnQ). I also compute two
country-level indices: (i) "Index Level-14 Cross-Listed Companies" (I,4)
which equals the median for each country of 6lnQ for level-14 companies,
and (ii) "Index Non Cross Listed Companies (Ij,), which equals the median
for each country of 81nQ for non-cross-listed companies.
For each matched pair, I calculate a "pair premium" (PP) at year-end
2001 and year-end 2002. The pair premium is ln(Tobin's q of a cross-listed
company minus the Tobin's q of its match), which I then winsorize at
1%/99%. I then compute the after-minus-before difference in the pair pre-
mium (DDQ). For each country, I also compute a "Matched Pairs Index 14"
(IMP4) that equals the median of DDQ for level- 14 companies.
This pair premium captures the value of exposure to U.S. markets and,
for level-23 firms, U.S. regulation, as perceived by investors. It also captures
any other sources of differences in Tobin's q that are not captured by the
match on country and industry and the rough match on size. These differ-
ences are known to be important-for example, firms that cross-list
generally have higher growth prospects than apparently similar firms that do
not cross-list.
3 4
Tobin's q values and, even more so, market/book ratios are prone to out-
liers, typically for firms with high levels of intangible assets or very low
book values (often reflecting prior losses). To reduce the effect of outliers, I
winsorize all observations at 1%/99%, as noted above. In robustness checks
(not reported), I winsorize at different levels, do not take logarithms, and
exclude outliers rather than winsorizing. Results for ln(Tobin's q) are simi-
lar; results for ln(market/book) are similar but somewhat weaker without
winsorizing or excluding outliers; results without taking logs are weaker,
and regression standard errors may also be biased due to non-normality of
the residuals.
33. See Litvak, supra note 10.
34. See, e.g., Doidge et al., supra note 14.
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More formally, let c index countries, I index listing level (1 = 23, 14, or
match), i index the n cross-listed companies (for convenience, let i cumulate
across all firms in all countries), t index year, and n23 (n,4) be the number of
level-23 (level-14) firms in the sample. Let Q,23 i,, be the Tobin's q of level-
23 cross-listed company i, from country c, on level 23, at time t, and simi-
larly for level-14 and non-cross-listed companies. We are interested in the
change in company and pair premia:
Companies:
JIn Qc, i, i = ln(q)c, 1, i, after - ln(q)c, 1, i, before
Matched Pairs:
DDQc, i, i = ln(Qc, 23or14, i, after - Qc, match, i, after)
- ln(Qc, 23or14, i, before - Qc, match, i, before)
For all level-23 companies, the mean after-minus-before change in
ln(Tobin's q) is
SIn Q23 = _ (JIn Qe, l,i)]
n23 1=23
And similarly for level-14 firms and non-cross-listed firms.
The difference between the change in mean ln(Tobin's q) for cross-listed
firms on level 23 and the change for non-cross-listed firms is
At1n Q23 = Sin Q23 - S1n Qmatch
And similarly for the difference between level-14 firms and non-cross-listed
firms.
For matched pairs, the analogous difference in means is
1
DDQ23 = [ I (DDQc, 1,i)]
nl23 1=23
And similarly for level- 14 pairs and all pairs.
Computational dissimilarities (based on when we take logs) aside, the
"companies" and "pairs" differences in means differ only because the com-
parison set of non-cross-listed companies for the "companies difference"
A6lnQ23 includes all non-cross-listed companies in the sample, not only the
matches for the level-23 companies.
Finally, for companies, I compute the difference between (the difference
in mean ln(Tobin's q) for level-23 firms versus matching firms) and (the
analogous difference for level- 14 firms versus-matching firms):
Tiln Q23 -14 = ASln Q23 - ASn Q14
For matched pairs, I similarly compute the difference between (the mean
after-minus-before difference in pair premia for level-23 pairs) and (the
mean after-minus-before difference in pair premia for level- 14 pairs), as
1872 [Vol. 105:1857
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TDQ 23 -14 = (DDQ23 - DDQ,4)
The difference between (level-23 differences versus non-cross-listed
firms) and (level-14 differences versus cross-listed firms) should hopefully
control for other factors that affect the attractiveness of U.S. equity markets
generally.
Computational dissimilarities aside, the "companies" and "pairs" differ-
ences in differences-in-means are again quite similar. The principal
distinction is that in the companies specification, each group is not first
compared to its firm-specific matches. The estimates will differ primarily if
the mean change in Tobin's q for the level-23 matches differs from the mean
change in Tobin's q for the level- 14 matches.
The ASlnQ variable for company-level results (DDQ for matched pairs)
can be understood as a difference-in-difference estimate.5 For pairs, for ex-
ample, the pair premium (difference in Tobin's q between a cross-listed firm
and its match) is the first difference, and the before-to-after difference in
pair premia is the second difference. The ThlnQ variable for company re-
sults (TDQ variable for matched pairs) can be understood as a triple
difference estimate.
B. Regression Analysis: Cross-Sectional Variation
I also conduct regression estimates of the firm-level or pair-level after-
minus-before change in Tobin's q, and the factors that predict cross-
sectional variation in firm (pair) changes. Consider first regressions with the
sample limited to level-23 companies or pairs. For level-23 companies, the
regression equation analogous to triple differences is
{61nQc,ii = a + 771 * 114 + 772 * Incl + Ec, l,i I I = 231
The coefficient a on the constant term gives the estimated before-to-after
change in Tobin's q for level-23 companies. The 14 and I, indices control
for country-level changes in mean Tobin's q for level-14 companies and
non-cross-listed companies. All regressions also include country random
effects to control for country-level factors that affect Tobin's q but are not
captured by these indices. In robustness checks, I also use country fixed ef-
fects, with similar results (not reported). I present random effects
specifications because this allows me to report the coefficients on country-
level variables; these variables are dropped with country fixed effects.
For level-23 pairs, the analogous regression equation is simply
{DDc, 1, i -= + 77 * IMP 14 + Ec, l,i I 1 = 23)
The coefficient a on the constant term gives the estimated before-to-after
change in In(pair difference in Tobin's q) for level-23 pairs. The IMP14 index
35. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, How Much Should
We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, 119 Q. J. EcoN. 249 (2004).
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controls for country-level changes in the differences in Tobin's q between
level-14 firms and their matches.
An alternative approach is to include all cross-listed companies in the
regression, and add a dummy variable (dum23 = 1 for level-23 companies, 0
otherwise) to capture the return to level-23 companies, and similarly for
matched pairs. For companies, the regression equation becomes
i1nQc,i,i =a +%r*dum23 +71 *114 +72 * Ic + Ec,l,i
For matched pairs, the analogous regression is
DD, ~i = a +r %*dum23 +7 *IMP14 +Ec,l,i
In both regressions, the coefficient X on the level-23 dummy gives the
estimated change in ln(Tobin's q), controlling for changes in Tobin's q for
level-14 and non-cross-listed firms.
These regression equations can be extended to assess the importance of
firm-level characteristics (for example, size, sales growth, firm-level disclo-
sure) and country-level characteristics (for example, GDP, country-level
disclosure quality, or creditor rights) in predicting cross-sectional variation
in the after-minus-before change in Tobin's q. Let Xi be a vector of firm and
country characteristics, indexed by j. Consider first a regression limited to
level-23 companies or pairs. We can estimate, for companies
[31nQ,,i,i = a+ (j *Xj) + q/I *114 + 772 * Ind + Ec, , i I I = 23]
J
And for matched pairs
[DDc, 1,i = a +1(,#j *Xj) + 7 *IMP4 + Ecl,i I I = 23]
i
In both equations, the 13j provide estimates of the effect of the X on the after-
minus-before change in Tobin's q.
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For regressions including all cross-listed companies (all pairs), the re-
gression equations are
lfnac,1,i = +X+%*dum23 + Z(li *Xj) + 71 *1 4 +172 * ,1
J
+ o * dum23 *Xj +EcIi
DDc, 1,i =a +X* dum 23 + (#j * X) + r * IMP14
J
+ (ogj *dum23 * Xj + C, 1,i
The coefficients woj on the interaction terms give the predicted effect of the
firm-level or country-level variable on the difference in after-minus-before
Tobin's q (or market/book ratio) between level-23 and level-14 companies
(pairs).
IV. RESULTS
Table 2 presents basic results for the changes in cross-listing premia be-
fore and after SOX adoption. The pre-SOX period is defined as the year-end
2001 and post-SOX period as the year-end 2002. As a robustness check, I
narrow down the before-and-after period to the interval between April and
October of 2002, when most of the important SOX-related information was
36
released, with similar results .
36. For details on relevant dates of information releases, see Litvak, supra note 10,.
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TABLE 2
AFTER SOX (YEAR-END 2002) MINUS BEFORE SOX (YEAR-END 2001)
CHANGES IN LN(TOBIN'S Q) AND LN(MARKET/BOOK RATIO)
All panels: Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% lev-
els. Significant results (at 10% level or better) are in boldface.
Panel A: Mean after (2002) minus before (2001) changes in ln(Tobin's q) for
cross-listed companies separated by listing level (Column 2) and for all non-cross-
listed companies (Column 3). The double difference is reported in Column 4, and its
statistical significance is reported in Columns 5 and 6. Double differences are win-
sorized at 1%/99%.
PANEL A: RESULTS FOR SINGLE COMPANIES, LN(TOBIN'S Q)
Xlisted All Non- Xlisted - T-Stat Wilcoxon No. of Xlisted
Firms by Xlisted Non-Xlisted (Xlisted - (Xlisted v (Non-Xlisted)
Level Firms Change Non-Xlisted) Non-Xlisted) Firms
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 All -0.107 -0.099 -0.008 0.44 1.77* 806(729)
2 Level-23 -0.171 -0.099 -0.072 -2.75- -2.75** 315
3 Level-14 -0.067 -0.099 0.032 1.56 3.60- 491
4 T-Stat
-4.49**(23 minus14)
S Wilcoxon
-4.61"*(23 miflus14)-41
Panel B: Mean after-minus-before change in the difference between ln(Tobin's
q of cross-listed firm minus Tobin's q of non-cross-listed match), for all matched
pairs (row 1), level-23 pairs (row 2) and level-14 pairs (row 3). Each pair consists of
one cross-listed company and a match from the same country, same industry, and
similar in size. The double difference is reported in Column 4 and its statistical sig-
nificance is in Columns 5 and 6. Double differences are winsorized at 1%/99%.
PANEL B: RESULTS FOR MATCHED PAIRS, LN(TOBIN'S Q)
Pair Premium Pair After Minus T-Statistic Wilcoxon No. of Matched
Before SOX Premium Before (After - (After - PairsAfter SOX Change Before) Before)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 All -0.0106 -0.0158 -0.0052 0.28 1.50 574
2 Level-23 -0.0035 -0.0234 -0.0199 0.88 0.96 221
3 Level-14 -0.0160 -0.221 -0.006 -0.35 1.16 353
T-Stat
(23-14)
Wilcoxon 0.15
(23-14)
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Panel C: Similar to Panel A except it uses ln(market-to-book ratio) instead of
ln(Tobin's q).
PANEL C: RESULTS FOR SINGLE COMPANIES, LN
(MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIO)
Xlisted All Non- Xllsted - T-Stat (Xllsted Wilcoxon No. of Xlisted
Firms by Xlisted Non-Xlisted - Non- (Xlisted v (Non-Xlisted)
Level Firms Change Xlisted) Non-Xlisted) Firms
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 All -0.148 -0.0965 -0.0515 -1.91" -2.47- 729(685)
2 Level-23 -0.237 -0.0965 -0.1405 -3.74* -4.74* 267
3 Level-14 -0.096 -0.0965 0.0005 0.27 0.259 462
T-Stat
(23- 14)
Wilcoxon
(23- 14)
Panel D: Similar to Panel B except it uses market-to-book ratio instead of
Tobin's q.
PANEL D: RESULTS FOR MATCHED PAIRS, LN
(MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIO)
Pair After Minus T-Statistic Wilcoxon No. ofParoremium Premium Before (After - (After - Matched
After SOX Change Before) Before) Pairs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 All 0.104 0.0569 -0.047 -1.69* -2.34- 516
2 Level-23 0.163 0.119 -0.044 -1.77" -2.17"* 187
3 Level-1 4 0.054 0.0459 -0.008 -0.73 -1.27 329
4 T-Stat
(23-14) -1.08
5 Wilcoxon -0.99
(23- 14)
Panel A contains the results of a single-company approach. Column 2
contains mean after-minus-before SOX changes in Tobin's q for cross-listed
companies, separately for those subject to SOX (Row 2) and those not subject
to SOX (Row 3). Next, I determine whether Tobin's q of cross-listed compa-
nies subject to SOX also declined as compared to non-cross-listed companies.
The after-minus-before SOX changes in Tobin's q of non-cross-listed compa-
nies are reported in Column 3; Column 4 reports double differences. During
2002, the average Tobin's q of all groups of foreign companies declined, but it
declined most strongly in companies subject to SOX. Level-23 companies lost
on average 17% of their Tobin's q, which is 7.2 % more than the loss of non-
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cross-listed companies from the same country. Level- 14 companies lost on
average 6.7 percent of their Tobin's q. The difference between the loss of
level-23 companies and the loss of non-cross-listed companies is statistically
significant, as reported in Columns 5 and 6. Likewise, the difference between
the declines of level-23 companies and level-14 companies is significant (Col-
umn 2, Rows 4 and 5). That is, SOX-affected firms lost more value that either
category of SOX-unaffected firms. The difference between the loss of level- 14
companies and the loss of non-cross-listed companies is significant, but with
the opposite sign. That is, the premia of SOX-affected cross-listed firms de-
clined significantly, while the premia of other cross-listed firms increased.
This supports the view that investors reacted negatively to the contents of
SOX and separated cross-listed companies subject to SOX from cross-listed
companies not subject to SOX.
Panel B looks at matched pairs rather than individual companies. There
is a drop in sample size, due to the need for data on Tobin's q for two firms
at two dates. Pair premium is calculated as ln(Tobin's q of a cross-listed
company minus a Tobin's q of its non-cross-listed match), separately for the
before-SOX period (Column 2) and the after-SOX period (Column 3). As
Rows 4 and 5 show, both before and after SOX, level-23 pairs had higher
pair premia than level-14 pairs, but the difference is not significant.
Panels C and D parallel Panels A and B, but they use market-to-book ra-
tios as an alternative measure of cross-listing premia, with similar results.
As Panel C shows, mean market-to-book ratios of level-23 companies de-
clined significantly during 2002 (by 23.7%), while mean market-to-book
ratios of level-14 companies and non-cross-listed companies declined only
slightly (9.6% and 9.7%, respectively). As Columns 5 and 6 report, the dif-
ference is significant for level-23 companies, but not for level-14
companies. The difference between these two groups is significant. That is,
premia of SOX-affected cross-listed firms declined compared to both con-
trol groups, but premia of SOX-unaffected cross-listed firms did not change
significantly.
Likewise, as Panel D shows, mean premium of level-23 pairs was 16.3%
before SOX (Column 2) and declined by 4.4% after SOX (Column 4). At the
same time, pair premia of level-14 pairs declined only slightly, by 0.8 per-
cent (Column 4). The decline is statistically significant for level-23 pairs,
but not for level-14 pairs (Columns 5 and 6).
In short, foreign companies cross-listed in the United States, but not ex-
posed to SOX, exhibited changes in market-to-book ratios similar to those
of foreign companies not cross-listed in the United States. The decline of
level-23 firms appears to be driven by the exposure to SOX itself, not by
general trends common to all companies traded in the United States.
The four panels of Table 2 provide four different measures of changes in
cross-listing premia, and the results are similar. Three panels support the
view that cross-listing premia of companies subject to SOX declined after
the adoption of SOX, as compared to the changes in premia of non-cross-
listed companies or cross-listed companies not subject to SOX. One panel
(Panel B) contains insignificant results.
1878 [Vol. 105:1857
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Table 3 presents basic regression results. Panel A reports after-minus-
before changes for single companies, with Tobin's q (Columns 1 and 2) and
market-to-book ratios (Columns 3 and 4) as measures of premia. I control
for contemporaneous events by using two hand-collected indices: a median
after-minus-before SOX change in ln(Tobin's q) for companies cross-listed
on level 1 or 4 (this controls for exposure to U.S. markets without exposure
to SOX), and a median after-minus-before SOX change in ln(Tobin's q) for
non cross-listed companies (this controls for contemporaneous home-
country events). I also control for company size and home country GDP per
capita.
In Columns 1 and 3, the sample is all foreign companies, listed on all
levels. The coefficient of interest is that on the "Dummy-23" variable. This
coefficient is negative and significant at a 1% level for both Tobin's q and
market-to-book specifications. In Columns 2 and 4, I limit the sample to
level-23 companies only; the coefficient of interest is on the constant term.
This coefficient is negative and significant in both specifications. That is,
foreign companies subject to SOX experienced significant declines in cross-
listing premia as compared to foreign companies cross-listed in the United
States but not subject to SOX.
Michigan Law Review
TABLE 3
BASIC REGRESSIONS FOR LN(TOBIN'S Q)
AND LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK)
Panel A: Single Companies. In Columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is
the firm-level after (2002) minus before (2001) change in ln(Tobin's q) for cross-
listed companies. In Columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the after-minus-
before difference in ln(market-to-book ratio). The independent variables are the
following: "Dummy-23" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is listed on
level 2 or 3; ln(assets); ln(GDP per capita); "Level-14 Index" is the country-level
median of the after-minus-before difference in the dependent variable for cross-
listed level- 14 companies; "Non-Cross-Listed Index" is the country-level median of
the after-minus-before difference in the dependent variable for non cross-listed com-
panies, and a constant term. In Columns 1 and 3, the sample is all cross-listed
companies on all levels; the coefficient of interest is on Dummy-23. In Columns 2
and 4, the sample is limited to level-23 companies; the coefficient of interest is on
the constant term. All regressions use country random effects with robust standard
errors, country clusters. T-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. Both
double differences are winsorized at 1%/99%. Symbols *, **, *** indicate signifi-
cance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in
boldface.
1 2 3 4
All Cross- All Cross- Level-23
Sample Listed Cemeanie Listed
Companies Companies Companies. Companies
Dependent Variable: After-minus- In(Tobin's q) ln(market/book)
before change in
-0.114 -0.148
(3.32)*** (3.63)***
Firm Size (Ln assets) 0.016 0.077 -0.017 0.038
0.93 (3.20) .. . 0.85 1.30
-0.011 -0.084 -0.014 -0.058
-1.09 (2.17)"'. -0.82 1.10
Level-1 4 and Non-Cross-Listed
Indices yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.016 -0.110 -0.037 -0.268
1.04 (2.38)** (2.111)** (5.62)***
No. of Observations 771 310 673 241
R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.02
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Panel B: Matched Pairs. In Columns I and 2, the dependent variable is the
double difference of In(Tobin's q) for matched pairs: after-minus-before difference
in In(Tobin's q for cross-listed firm minus Tobin's q for non-cross-listed match). In
Columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is similarly defined as double difference in
In(market-to-book). The independent variables are Dummy-23; In(assets of cross-
listed firm); In(GDP per capita); an index for the country-level median of the double
difference for level-14 pairs ("Matched Pairs Index 14"), and a constant term. In
Columns I and 3, the sample is all matched pairs on all levels; the coefficient of
interest is on Dummy-23. In Columns 2 and 4, the sample is limited to level-23
matched pairs; the coefficient of interest is on the constant term. All regressions use
country random effects with robust standard errors, country clusters. T-statistics are
reported under regression coefficients. Double differences are winsorized at 1%/99%.
Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant
results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface.
1 2 3 4
All AllLevel-23 Level-23
Sample Matched Matched Pairs
Pairs Pairs
Dependent variable: after-minus-
before difference in In(pair difference Tobin's q market/book
in indicated variable)
-0.198 -0.119
(1.69)' 0.99
0.095 0.405 -0.054 0.132
Ln(assets of cross-listed firm) 1.38 .05 -0.89 1341.38 (3.03) ... -0.89 1.44
0.002 -0.154 -0.125 -0.186
0.07 (2.02)** (-2.39)** 1.43
Matched Pairs Index 14 yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.057 -0.253 -1.064 -1.057
0.94 (3.09)*** (7.93)*** (12.02)***
No. of Observations 226 82 240 90
R-squared 0.05 0.20 0.09 0.12
Panel B presents the results of the same tests for matched pairs, rather
than single companies. The results are similar in magnitude to those re-
ported in Panel A, but weaker statistically, likely because of the smaller
sample size. The Level-23 dummy is now significant only at a 10% level for
Tobin's q specification and is not significant for market-to-book specifica-
tion. The constant terms in Columns 2 and 4, however, are consistently
strong and negative. In this table, I control for contemporaneous events in
two ways: (1) by using matched pairs as a dependent variable, and (2) by
using a hand-collected index of median changes in Tobin's q among level-14
matched pairs. Other controls are similar to Panel A.
The overall result is a strong decline in cross-listing premia of foreign
companies subject to SOX, controlling for reactions of otherwise similar
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foreign companies not subject to SOX-both cross-listed and non-cross-
listed. This is consistent with the view that investors of foreign cross-listed
companies believed SOX to be a net negative.
The next question is which country- or company-level characteristics
predict changes in cross-listing premia.
Table 4 reports country-level results both for Tobin's q and for market-
to-book ratios. For each country, it compares the average change in
ln(Tobin's q) or ln(market/book) for level-23 firms with the average change
for non-cross-listed firms.
TABLE 4
COUNTRY-LEVEL RESULTS FOR SINGLE COMPANIES
(LEVEL-23 VERSUS NON-CROSS-LISTED)
Table 4 lists the following data: mean after (2002) minus before (2001) change in
In(Tobin's q) for level-23 firms (Column 2) and for non-cross-listed firms (Column 3);
the difference between changes in level-23 and non-cross-listed fims (Column 3), and
statistical significance of the double difference (Columns 4 and 5). Columns 6-9 do
the same for market-to-book ratios. Double differences are winsorized at 1%/99%.
Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Significant or marginally significant results (at 10% level or better) are in boldface.
In(Tobin's 0) In(Market-to-Book Ratio)
Level-
T-Stat 23
Level-23 Non- Level- Wilcoxon Xlisted Non- T-Stat Wilcoxon
Xlisted Xlisted 23- Level-23- After- Xlisted Level-23- Level-23-
After- After- Xlisted- Xlisted Minus- After- Xlisted- Xlisted
Minus- Minus- versus- versus- Before Minus- versus- versus-
Before Before non- non- Chang Before non- non-
Country Change Change Xlisted Xlisted e Change Xlisted Xlisted
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Argentina 0.314 -0.017 2.081* 1.521 -0.179 -0.340 1.390 1.352
Australia 0.057 -0.143 1.176 1.352 0.014 0.036 -0.095 -0.338
Brazil -0.037 0.089 -2.518** -2.677* -0.085 0.012 -1.351 -1.303
Canada -0.188 -0.048 -2.474** -2.488** -0.217 -0.052 -1.938* -2.079**
Chile -0.124 -0.105 -1.088 -1.067 -0.445 -0.047 -2.895** -2.803**
China -0.140 -0.207 1.065 0.734 -0.037 -0.229 1.339 0.734
Denmark -0.593 -0.286 -1.000 -0.634 -0.345 -1.000
Finland -0.223 -0.099 -0.804 -0.365 -0.396 -0.017 -2.340 -1.826*
France -0.401 -0.165 -3.338*** -2.889*** -0.404 -0.152 -1.399 -1.503
Germany -0.267 -0.237 -0.534 -0.682 -0.289 -0.324 0.439 0.392
Greece -0.309 -0.288 -0.200 -0.447 -0.628 -0.641 0.181 0.447
Hong Kong -0.215 -0.106 -0.964 -0.980 -0.396 -0.166 -0.866 -0.845
India -0.032 0.067 -0.975 -1.014 -0.430 0.232 -3.094- -2.366**
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In(Tobin's 0) In(Market-to-Book Ratio)
Level-
T-Stat 23
Level-23 Non- Level- Wilcoxon Xlisted Non- T-Stat Wilcoxon
Xlisted Xlisted 23- Level-23- After- Xlisted Level-23- Level-23-
After- After- Xlisted- Xlisted Minus- After- Xlisted- Xlisted
Minus- Minus- versus- versus- Before Minus- versus- versus-
Before Before non- non- Chang Before non- non-
Country Change Change Xlisted Xlisted e Change Xlisted Xlisted
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Israel -0.212 -0.449 3.100** 1.753* -0.378 -0.496 0.471 0.365
Italy -0.131 -0.117 -0.344 -0.415 -0.303 -0.032 -1.785 -1.690*
Japan -0.107 -0.043 -1.651 -1.603 -0.144 -0.115 -0.605 -0.517
Korea -0.073 -0.214 2.219* 2.023** -0.095 0.043 -0.854 -0.674
Mexico -0.038 -0.084 0.868 0.852 -0.013 -0.143 1.046 1.988*
Norway -0.038 -0.242 2.265 1.826* 0.071 -0.305 1.548 1.069
Netherlands -0.314 -0.100 -1.105 -0.944 -0.381 -0.331 -0.213 0.000
Peru -0.303 0.181 -1.000 -0.606 0.205 -5.262 -1.342
Portugal -0.122 0.033 -1.000 -0.638 0.000 -1.000
Russia 0.118 -0.173 18.830** 1.342 0.222 -0.178 12.196* 1.342
South Africa 0.573 -0.041 3.382** 1.761 * 0.525 -0.092 1.984 1.483
Singapore -0.677 -0.104 -3.472 -1.342 -0.886 0.019 -1.747 -1.342
Spain -0.063 -0.047 -0.583 -0.674 -0.284 0.035 -3.745** -1.826*
Sweden -0.275 -0.184 -0.610 -0.178 -0.421 -0.122 -1.178 -1.244
Switzerland -0.260 -0.178 -0.760 -0.420 -0.374 -0.212 -1.087 -1.014
Taiwan -0.539 -0.172 -4.653** -1.826* -0.677 -0.122 -5.002** -1.826*
UnitedKigd -0.298 -0.211 -1.593 -0.400 -0.278 -0.152 -1.042 -1.359Kingdom
Most country-level changes are not statistically significant, likely be-
cause of the small number of observations in each country. There are no
obvious strong trends. Companies from some developed countries experi-
enced significant declines in cross-listing premia (Canada, France, Italy,
Spain, Taiwan), while companies from other developed countries experi-
enced increases (Israel, Korea, Norway).37
In Table 5, I aggregate countries into larger geographic regions and look
at changes in cross-listing premia separately in Europe, Asia, and Latin
America. Most of the negative effect is concentrated in level-23 companies
of Europe and Asia.
37. While some authors count Italy among countries with poor corporate governance, see
Paolo F. Volpin, Governance With Poor Investor Protection: Evidence from Top Executive Turnover,
64 J. FIN. EcON. 61 (2002), Italy might be among the well-governed if we compare it to countries
outside Europe. For example, on the basis of my sample, the country median S&P disclosure score
is 59 for Italy, but only 29 for Brazil, 30 for Argentina, 32 for the Philippines, 45 for Malaysia, and
49 for Korea. Among the high-governed countries are the United Kingdom (S&P median score in
my sample is 72) and Ireland (75).
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TABLE 5
REGIONAL RESULTS
Both panels: Changes in ln(Tobin's q), by geographic region. Columns 2-4 present
single-company results. Columns 5-7 present matched-pairs results. Variables are de-
fined in Table 2. Double differences are winsorized at 1%/99%. Symbols *, **, ***
indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant or marginally significant
results (at 10% level or better) are in boldface.
o 
_ _' -, -"
O O, --- '
0 --
o o MU
Z &a -t
'~ (O8
~ C -
'- 0
0), .9 --W
-
4,
,..
Cc
W r A oL
WJ U. ~C) C5~O Cq - CAD R U
Cz .7 17 6q 996
z- Z
LO) .MO 0
0) c'J S_ B 0)
0 E 0 UU~
F- M 4 401 ER
June 2007] Sarbanes-Oxley and the Cross-Listing Premium 1885
oa
o - 9 o .
00 C_,=
z
2 CD
V))
I -L2 .c C.,
U -a
CC'
2 ,
Cz CD C;
ZWca. W l "o
Z C)
C) *.) 41
-c C,
ow 12C . _ 4
H .9) C
o Ix CDC
o
T0cros- cn reut. In these tbsIa wi
C- 
0
company- or country-level characteristics predict post-SOX changes in
cross-listing premia. Tables 6-8 look at Tobin's q changes in individual
companies, Table 9 looks at Tobin's q changes in matched pairs, and Table
10 looks at market-to-book changes in both individual companies and
matched pairs. All regressions use country random effects with robust stan-
dard errors, country clusters. Country fixed effects produce similar results
(not reported).
Michigan Law Review
Table 6 studies company-level predictors of after-SOX changes in Tobin's q.
Panel A uses all cross-listed companies and interactions between variables
of interest with the dummy for level-23 listing. Strong predictors are the S&P
measure of disclosure (negative), firm asset size (positive), pre-SOX profitabil-
ity (negative), and the degree of a firm's ownership concentration (negative,
marginally significant). A firm's unsystematic risk is a negative predictor, mar-
ginally significant and not always robust.
Panel B limits the sample to level-23 companies. Again, the S&P meas-
ure of disclosure is a strong negative predictor of after-SOX changes in Tobin's
q; firm asset size is a positive predictor; and profitability is a negative predictor
(not always robust). Pre-SOX unsystematic risk is now a strong and consistently
negative predictor.
TABLE 6
CROSS-SECTIONAL RESULTS: COMPANY-LEVEL VARIABLES
Both Panels: the dependent variable is the after (2002) minus before (2001) dif-
ference in ln(Tobin's q) for cross-listed companies. Differences in ln(Tobin's q) are
winsorized at 1%/99%. Non-dummy independent variables are standardized to
mean = 0; a = 1. All regressions use country random effects with robust standard
errors, country clusters. T-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. Sym-
bols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at
5% level or better) are in boldface.
In Panel A, the independent variables are: Dummy23; Level-14 Index; Non-
Cross-Listed Index (all defined in Table 3); additional variables listed in the table, and
interactions between these variables and Dummy-23. Panel A includes all cross-listed
companies. Panel B is limited to level-23 companies. All variables are the same, ex-
cept that Dummy-23 and interactions are replaced with non-interacted variables.
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These results are consistent with the view that investors perceived SOX
as a net negative for cross-listed companies overall and that the biggest los-
ers were well-governed companies and smaller companies. These findings
also support the view that SOX may have penalized corporate risk-taking.
In Table 7, I move to country-level predictors. As in Table 6, Panel A
uses all cross-listed companies and interactions between variables of interest
with the dummy for level-23 listing. Panel B limits the sample to level-23
companies.
I construct a new country-level measure of disclosure, equal to the country
median (for my sample) of company-level measures of disclosure provided by
S&P. In both panels, this country-level measure of disclosure emerges as the
strongest negative predictor of post-SOX changes in Tobin's q.
Country ln(GDP per capita) also negatively predicts reaction to SOX;
however, this result does not survive when country-level disclosure is also
included. Spamann's measure of anti-director rights is another negative pre-
dictor, but it is statistically significant only in one specification. I do not find
significance for other country-level economic variables (number of IPOs per
capita) and legal variables (LLSV measure of antidirector rights and the
quality of the accounting system). I also check whether political economy
variables developed by Mark Roe" predict changes in a company's
Tobin's q around SOX. None of those variables emerges as a significant
predictor, either alone or in combination with other variables (only results
for Labor Regulation are reported).
TABLE 7
CROSS-SECTIONAL RESULTS: COUNTRY-LEVEL VARIABLES
Both Panels: the dependent variable is the after (2002) minus before (2001) dif-
ference in ln(Tobin's q) for cross-listed companies. Differences in ln(Tobin's q) are
winsorized at 1%/99%. Other controls include ln(assets); profitability, and sales
growth. Non-dummy independent variables are standardized to mean = 0; a = 1. All
regressions use country random effects with robust standard errors, country clusters.
T-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. Symbols *, **, *** indicate
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are
in boldface.
In Panel A, the independent variables are: Dummy23; Index Level-14 Cross-
Listed Companies; Index Non-Cross-Listed Companies (all defined in Table 3); addi-
tional variables listed in the table, and interactions between these variables and
Dummy-23. Panel A includes all cross-listed companies. Panel B is limited to level-23
companies. All variables are the same, except that Dummy-23 and interactions are
replaced with non-interacted variables.
38. See Roe, supra note 32.
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In Table 8, I combine company- and country-level characteristics. Panel
A presents the results for all cross-listed companies, with variables of inter-
est interacted with the level-23 dummy. Panel B limits the sample to level-
23 companies. I use the original S&P firm-level measure of disclosure,
rather than the country-level measure used in Table 7. The results are simi-
lar, but not identical, to those reported in Tables 6 and 7. The quality of a
firm's pre-SOX disclosure loses its significance. Firm size remains a strong
positive predictor. Firm profitability and unsystematic risk, along with home
country GDP per capita, are all strong negative predictors. Spamann's meas-
ure of antidirector rights is a negative predictor as well, but only marginally
significant.
TABLE 8
CROSS-SECTIONAL RESULTS: COMBINED COMPANY-LEVEL AND
COUNTRY-LEVEL VARIABLES
In Panel A, the dependent variable is the after (2002) minus before (2001)
difference in ln(Tobin's q) for cross-listed companies. The independent variables are
Dummy23; Level-14 Index; Non-Cross-Listed Index (all defined in Table 3);
additional variables listed in the table, and interactions between these variables and
Dummy-23. Panel A includes all cross-listed companies. Panel B is limited to level-
23 companies; independent variables are the same, except that Dummy-23 and its
interactions are omitted. Differences in ln(Tobin's q) are winsorized at 1%/99%.
Non-dummy independent variables are standardized to mean = 0; a = 1. All
regressions use country random effects with robust standard errors, country clusters.
T-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. Symbols *, **, *** indicate
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better)
are in boldface.
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Table 9 presents the results of matched-pairs analysis of changes in
Tobin's q. As discussed before, sample size declines significantly in
matched pairs specification, which makes the results less reliable. Neverthe-
less, the results are similar to those obtained in the single-company
approach. Level-23 matched pairs experienced significant declines in
Tobin's q, as compared to level-14 matched pairs. Among company-level
variables, firm size remains a positive predictor and pre-SOX unsystematic
risk is a negative predictor. On a country level, Spamann's measure of anti-
director rights is a significant negative predictor (albeit not in Panel B,
where the sample size is small), and GDP per capita is a negative predictor
as well. Disclosure, which was significant in Tables 6 and 7, is not signifi-
cant in Tables 8 and 9; this might be due to the high correlation between
disclosure and GDP per capita (r = 0.55).
TABLE 9
MATCHED-PAIR RESULTS: COMPANY-LEVEL AND
COUNTRY-LEVEL VARIABLES
Same as Table 8, except it uses matched pairs instead of individual companies.
Both Panels: the dependent variable is after-minus-before difference in ln(Tobin's q
for cross-listed firm minus Tobin's q for non-cross-listed match). Double differences
are winsorized at 1%/99%. Non-dummy independent variables are standardized to
mean = 0; a = 1. All regressions use country random effects with robust standard
errors, country clusters. T-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. Sym-
bols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at
5% level or better) are in boldface.
In Panel A, the independent variables are: Dummy-23; an index for the country-
level median of the double difference for level-14 pairs ("Matched Pairs Index 14");
additional variables listed in the table, and interactions between these variables and
Dummy-23. Panel A includes all cross-listed companies. Panel B is limited to level-23
companies. All variables are the same, except that Dummy-23 and interactions are
replaced with non-interacted variables.
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Finally, in Table 10, I measure cross-listing premia based on market-to-
book ratio, rather than Tobin's q. Columns 2-5 report the results for single
companies; Columns 7-10 report the results for matched pairs. Panels A and
C include all cross-listed firms; Panels B and D limit the sample to firms
(pairs) listed on levels 2 or 3. The results are similar to the results for
Tobin's q. Level-23 firms and pairs experienced significant overall declines
in market-to-book ratios, as compared to level-14 firms and pairs. Among
firm-level variables, firm size is a strong positive predictor of changes in
market-to-book ratios, and profitability is a negative predictor. Higher un-
systematic risk of a firm predicts a reduction in cross-listing premia in some
specifications. Disclosure is not significant (not reported).
TABLE 10
CROSS-SECTIONAL RESULTS: COMBINED COMPANY-LEVEL AND
COUNTRY-LEVEL VARIABLES, MARKET-TO-BOOK
In Panel A, the dependent variable is the after (2002) minus before (2001) differ-
ence in ln(market-to-book) for cross-listed companies. The independent variables are
Dummy-23; Index Level-14 Cross-Listed Companies; Index Non-Cross-Listed Com-
panies (all defined in Table 3); additional variables listed in the table, and interactions
between these variables and Dummy-23. Panel A includes all cross-listed companies.
Panel B is the same as Panel A, but limited to level-23 companies; independent vari-
ables are the same, except that Dummy-23 and its interactions are omitted. Panel C
and Panel D are similar to Panels A and B, but use matched pairs instead of single
companies. Non-dummy independent variables are standardized to mean = 0; a = 1.
Double differences are winsorized at 1%/99%. All regressions use country random
effects with robust standard errors, country clusters. T-statistics are reported under
regression coefficients. Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface.
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V. A PROPOSAL FOR DETERMINING THE EFFICACY OF SOX
This article and my prior event study suggest that the adoption of SOX
had larger costs than benefits for at least some cross-listed firms, especially
firms that were already likely to be well-governed. These overall findings do
not tell us which provisions of SOX are associated with the negative reac-
tion of investors of cross-listed firms. Perhaps SOX contains "good"
provisions (for which benefits exceed costs) as well as "bad" ones. It is also
possible that benefits exceeded costs for some firms, even if not on average.
Which provisions are "good" or "bad" could also depend on a firm's home
country environment and on other firm characteristics.
I therefore propose the following policy experiment, which will both
preserve the financial incentives for foreign firms to cross-list on level 2 or
3, and help us assess which provisions of SOX are likely to be helpful or
harmful-at least for cross-listed firms. The SEC could exempt cross-listed
firms from SOX compliance and instead allow them to adopt a "comply or
explain" approach, of a sort familiar from the corporate governance codes of
many countries, including the Combined Code in the United Kingdom.39
The comply-or-explain approach could potentially stem the current
flight of foreign issuers to overseas markets, and allow cross-listed firms to
recover the share price losses they appear to have suffered when SOX was
adopted. These firms' decisions on when to comply could also inform policy
judgments about whether and how to relax particular provisions of SOX for
U.S. firms. Event studies of share price reactions to foreign firms' decisions
to explain rather than comply could shed light on whether the choice not to
comply was good for shareholders. Evidence on investor reaction could then
form the basis for extending the comply-or-explain flexibility to U.S. issu-
ers, perhaps starting with smaller issuers, who are considered to bear a
greater burden relative to their size from SOX compliance costs.
The overall comply-or-explain approach moves in the direction of pro-
posals by Roberta Romano,4° and by Stephen Choi and Andrew Guzman,4'
for regulatory competition in securities regulation for public firms. This
39. U.K. firms which are listed on the London Stock Exchange must either comply with the
provisions of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance or explain their reasons for not comply-
ing. See Financial Reporting Council, The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2006),
http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/frcCombined%20code%202006%200CTOBER.pd
f. The Combined Code does not apply to foreign firms that cross-list in London. For the relevant
listing rules, see Financial Services Authority, Listing Rule 9.8.2 (2006), http://fsahandbook.info/
FSA/htnI/handbook/LR/9/8 (stating that company disclosures must comply with the company's
home country rules).
40. Romano, supra note 2; Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International
Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001).
41. Stephen J. Choi, Assessing Regulatory Responses to Securities Market Globalization, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 613 (July 2001); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew Guzman, Portable Recip-
rocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998).
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approach is also consistent with criticism of the extra-territorial reach of
U.S. securities law, which was increased by SOX.
42
Other scholars have criticized Romano's regulatory competition pro-
posal. 41 I do not enter that debate here. However, the step-by-step approach
suggested here, in which regulators first adopt a comply-or-explain regime
for foreign cross-listed firms and then use decisions by these firms and in-
vestor responses to assess whether to extend that regime to domestic firms,
could provide the empirical evidence needed to decide between the compet-
ing theories. In all likelihood, a move toward regulatory competition for
U.S. firms would be rule-specific rather than general. Some aspects of SOX
might remain mandatory for U.S. firms; others could be relaxed.
The incremental nature of this proposal also reflects the limits on what
we know about the net benefits or costs of SOX. This article focuses on the
change in cross-listing premia for level-23 firms from year-end 2001 to
year-end 2002, and finds a decline contemporaneous with adoption of SOX.
However, cross-listing premia vary substantially over a longer-time hori-
zon." Thus, the 2002 decline in cross-listing premia could also reflect
factors unrelated to SOX.45 Moreover, investors' views of the overall benefits
or costs of SOX could be different today than they were at the end of 2002.
Doidge and his coauthors report evidence that the cross-listing premium
accorded to level-23 companies, compared to level-14 companies, increased
during 2003-2005.46 One possible explanation for this rebound is that inves-
tors learned more about the net benefits and costs of SOX.
CONCLUSION
I report evidence of a decline in the cross-listing premium enjoyed by
foreign companies listed on levels 2 and 3 relative to cross-listed companies
listed on levels 1 and 4. The findings reported here are generally consistent
with my earlier research on price changes during SOX legislative events.
These findings are also consistent with the view that investors in foreign
cross-listed companies expected SOX to have a net negative effect on the
value of level-23 cross-listed firms.
42. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of
American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 207, 221 (1997).
43. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L.
REV, 1200 (1999); Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 563
(2001); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Inves-
tor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999).
44. See Craig Doidge, Andrew Karolyi, and Rene Stulz, The Valuation Premium for Non-
U.S. Stocks Listed in U.S. markets: 1997-2005 (Rotman Sch. of Mgmt. Working Paper, 2007) (un-
published manuscript, on file with author).
45. For evidence on other factors affecting cross-listing premia during 1980-1996, see Arturo
Bris, Salvatore Cantale, & George P. Nishiotis, A Breakdown of the Valuation Effects of Interna-
tional Cross-Listing (Yale ICF, Working Paper No. 05-30, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/
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The methodology used in this paper does not allow me to assess causa-
tion, but the use of double and triple differences presents evidence in favor
of a causal connection between adoption of SOX and my results, absent an-
other explanation for why the share prices of level-23 firms should have
declined relative to level-14 firms and relative to non-cross-listed firms dur-
ing this period.
In all single-company specifications, cross-listing premia of foreign
companies subject to SOX declined significantly, as compared to matched
non-cross-listed companies from the same country, the same industry, and
similar in size, and as compared to non-cross-listed companies from the
same country. At the same time, cross-listing premia for foreign companies
not subject to SOX declined substantially less (and, in some specifications,
insignificantly increased). This suggests that the mere exposure to U.S. capi-
tal markets does not explain the declines in cross-listing premia suffered by
cross-listed firms subject to SOX. Matched pair results are consistent in sign
and magnitude, though less significant statistically.
I also assess the factors that predict cross-sectional variation in the
change in cross listing premia during 2002. Companies that were already
high-disclosing (or from high-disclosing countries) suffered the largest ad-
verse effect. Cross-listing premia declined more for profitable and riskier
firms, and declined less for larger firms. These results suggest that the rela-
tive benefits and costs of SOX may depend on companies' pre-SOX
governance and other country-level and firm-level characteristics.
This article and my prior event study have similar but not identical re-
sults. Both find a significant negative investor reaction to SOX for level-23
cross-listed companies. Both find that well-governed firms and firms from
countries with high-quality laws and institutions reacted more negatively.
Country- and company-level measures of pre-SOX disclosure, home coun-
tries' GDP per capita, and several measures of home countries' investor
protection laws are significant predictors of reaction to SOX in both papers.
There are a few differences. This paper finds that larger firms reacted less
negatively; the event study does not find an effect based on size. The event
study finds a positive effect based on sales growth; this paper does not.
It is hard to tell which results are more likely to be "correct." This paper
looks over a longer time period and therefore deals with the possibility of a
short-term investor overreaction; this approach, however, introduces noise
and possible confounding events. The event study paper looks at the market
reaction during narrow event windows, often only one- or two-days; thus, it
cannot address the short-term overreaction problem, but it provides a more
rigorous control for contemporaneous events unrelated to SOX.
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